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Clearly, at these gatherings what we are doing is trying to fuse theory with practice, in order to 
produce policy and to plan action. This is much more satisfying than the usual arguments around 
“theory versus practice” and vice versa. The downside is that the fusion we are aiming at entails 
responsibility. If we get it wrong, we do not simply get criticized by other thinkers. If we get it 
wrong, people suffer. 
 
I have been teaching politics at University level for 20 years, have written books on it and have 
been repeatedly involved in political work. But the basis for this intervention is elsewhere – in 
the more than decade and a half I have spent in the field, trying to help along the attainment of 
civil society; and the ten years during which I have been leading the Centre for Social Practices 
– and NGO devoted to civil society and good governance. All of our projects are practical, and 
all of them have been outside of the capital Sofia, primarily at the municipal level, including 
matters such as the representation of agendas of minorities and of other under-represented 
groups and communities. We have also been involved in such actions in Macedonia, Slovakia 
and Serbia. 
 
Out of the reflections on these experiences comes this paper, and that is also the reason it looks 
like a collection of conclusions and generalizations, rather than a list of case studies. 
 
Where are we with civil society? 
 
What happened to the state? 
 
To know where we are we need a minimal knowledge of the background. For our purposes the 
story need not go back to Ferguson and Locke.  
 
We can start it in the 1980s, when “civil society” was the battle-cry of pro-democracy groups in 
the former socialist countries. That battle-cry succeeded the 1970s focus of democrats on human 
rights, and was a logical sequence of it: an evolution from the idea of the inviolability of the 
individual to the right of representation and self-determination of the nation and its 
communities. An evolution, if you will, from “negative freedom” (where the state does not 
block you) to “positive freedom”, where you set the context of your life and actions by self-
determination and control over the conditions in which power is exercised.  
 
This was a movement away from the idea of the “omnipotent state”, embodied in the communist 
practice of government.  
 
While we in the East were involved in this problematic, something was also happening in the 
West: a movement away from the idea of the “know-all” state. It was realized that the state “did 
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not know best” because, it became clear, it did not have superior expertise, nor – the Weberian 
detachment necessary for complete impartiality in representation and resource allocation. The 
outcome of this was the 1980s renewed emphasis on private initiative and the market.  
 
By the 1990s it had become clear that, while private initiative does do things better than the 
administrative machinery of the state, there are things it cannot do because it is not designed to. 
Such things include matters of representation, agenda-setting for communities and nations, 
national goal-formation – i.e. of politics in the Aristotelian sense as “things to do with the 
common future of the citizens gathered in the polis”.  
 
What happened to political parties? 
 
For a long time, and until recently, the common future of citizens was a subject matter addressed 
and represented exclusively and successfully by political parties. They formed the arena where 
thinking about the common future – and how to get there – took place, as did matters of 
community representation and citizen participation.  
 
Why, then, are we these days talking about subject, such as: low voter turnout, loss of trust in 
politicians, how to get citizens involved between elections and so forth? The reason is that 
people have ceased to bring all of their concerns, as citizens, to political parties. And this is not, 
as is sometimes said, because politicians themselves are to blame (because of being self-serving, 
or insensitive, or some other behavioural trait).  
 
The reason that people increasingly think of their future, as citizens, outside the framework of 
political parties is because the enabling environment of parties has changed – and this has 
weakened their capacity to collect in themselves all citizenship-related problematics. 
 
What has been happening is easy to see, with hindsight. Political parties arose in the 19th 
century, and the revolutionary Left was first in the field. What the Left presented as the 
desirable future was a complete re-design, along totally new lines, of the way society 
functioned. In defence of society as it was, the Right came into being, and this is how we ended 
up with the classic Left-Right political system that underpins any democratic politics worth the 
name.  
 
When the Left and the Right were presenting societies with completely different versions of the 
desirable future, it was an easy step for everybody to include all of their aspirations into one or 
the other camp. Everyone who wanted society as it was, with minor improvements, would feel 
fully represented by the Right. And everyone who wanted dramatic changes in the structure and 
aims of society would feel adequately represented by the Left. 
 
This is no longer the case, because over the past 20-odd years the Left and the Right have agreed 
on a basic framework of the desirable society. The Left has come to terms with the market 
economy and liberal democracy. The Right has made its own problematics such as solidarity 
and protection of the weak.  
 
Such agreement on the basics means that henceforth people, when acting as citizens, are 
beginning to focus on details, rather than on the grand picture. This is how we end up with 
people getting passionately involved in one-issue movements and causes that do not fit easily 
either into the classic Left-Right divide, or – into the Left-Right consensus as it stands today.  
 
This is how we end up with citizens withdrawing from political parties and wanting to attain 
representation, and also participation, by means other than political parties. This is, in short, how 
we end up with the whole problematic usually called “vibrant civil society”: citizen-like 
behaviour which does not flow along party political channels.  
 
Like the glaciers at the end of the Ice Age, political parties are slowly shrinking, and this 
shrinkage uncovers territories, where new phenomena – quasi-political, but not party-political – 
begin to take root.   
 
Is all of this good for democracy, or bad for democracy?  
 
Whatever it is, it is not going to be as easy as we all once thought. It requires brave new thinking 
and result-orientated new practices.  
 
It would have been a perfect world, had we been able to say that the future will bring to all 
nations an Anglo-American two-party liberal democracy. All we would have needed to do is – 
some copy-paste. That luxury, it is now clear, we are not being provided with.  
 
The values of democracy are the same: representation, dignity, rights, freedom, justice, 






As was discussed in an excellent recent conference on development, held in New Delhi, power 
is leaking from the state and from the political parties. We may not like this, but this is what is 
happening. Where is this power going? And what can we do about it anyway?  
 
There are two obvious scenarios here. 
 
Scenario One. In confident societies, people want to participate and be represented – but, 
increasingly, they want to do this alongside the structures of state and parties. In such societies 
power is going squarely into civil society and into communities. What needs to be done here is 
to re-design the enabling environment of democracy so as to re-establish it along four major 
pillars: government (which includes rule of law), politics, free media, civil society.  
 
It is in such societies that current ideas of reforming governance are immediately applicable. 
Here we see things such as: the re-formulation of governance from vertical to horizontal models; 
the re-invention of administrations from process-orientated to results-orientated; the re-design of 
policy-making in the direction of equal partnerships of all stakeholders, where government and 
politicians sit as equals of others; the agendas of representation, co-ownership, between-
elections participation, community-centered development and so forth.  
 
Of course, one also works for the strengthening of the state and the re-legitimation of parties as 
the pillars of representative democracy, and also addresses the thorny issue of media 
responsibility. 
 
The basic point here is that, as long as people want representation and participation, there is no 
tragedy when they do it outside government and politics and prefer civil society-kinds of forms 
of engagement.  
 
Scenario Two. There are societies with levels of confidence so low that, with trust in state and 
politics diminishing, people just stop behaving like citizens: cease to be willing to be involved in 
subjects and causes larger than the survival of themselves and their immediate families.  
 
This is where civil society – the public arena where people act for the common good – 
dissipates; and people close up in their family bunkers, leaving everything outside to a state they 
no longer trust. “Let those with power do as they will, I will survive”, is the sullen message of 
such atomized societies. 
 
With the state losing power, and with people withdrawing from citizenship-like behaviour, the 
terrain suddenly becomes free for the predators – for the mafias, the tycoon-capitalists and 
oligarchs, for the various fundamentalists, extremists and terrorists that are waiting in the 
shadows.  
 
This is where democracy becomes façade-democracy and representation becomes populism. The 
power leaking away from the state is collected by the bandits and other undesirables.  
 
We have seen this repeatedly, in some form, in most ex-socialist countries which are the new 
democracies of today. We will be seeing this in the dozens of countries that are beginning to 
grapple today with the idea of democracy.  
 
What can be done to convince a sullen and atomized society, with little or no confidence in its 
own capacities, to come out into the open, build and sustain democracies? We know, after some 
15 years of hit-miss efforts, that this cannot be done by just importing for local consumption 
ready-made models of government and politics. It is not a matter of imperative imposition – “Do 
this and you’ll get such-and-such results”. 
 
Liberal democracy is not embedded in human nature. It is a deliberate construct – an artifact. 
Luckily for us democrats, there are characteristics and desires, which are embedded in human 
nature, and which, with proper sensitive handling, can be encouraged to form the basis for the 
liberal democracy construct.  
 
Human beings want recognition and dignity. This is where we start, the basis on which we 
build. Once recognition and dignity are assured, along with the justice that comes with these 
things, human beings begin wanting representation. This is the subject with which we continue 
our democratic construction. Once represented, human beings acquire the confidence that makes 
them want to participate in decision-making. And, ultimately, they will want to take part in the 
formation of policy, implementation of policy, co-ownership of policy and the sharing of the 
results of policy.  
 
This may all happen through the classic social contract, i.e. through political parties and 
government. That would be perfect, for after 300 years’ experience, we know where we are with 
such things. More likely than not, however, the process of constructing liberal democracy – of 
making societies out of democratic values – will also go via pluralist media and the increasingly 




The world has never been such a dangerous place, in my lifetime at least. Moreover, it seems to 
be already spiraling in the wrong direction. Fundamentalism and radical extremism are on the 
rise, at the expense of representation and of inclusiveness.  
 
Investing in what the EU calls “vibrant civil society” is not an optional luxury – not something 
that we can play around with, and then drop if we choose to. It is crucial to invest in it – and to 
re-define good governance accordingly – if we want to keep power away from the bad guys and 
provide democracy with a stable basis.  
 
Keeping people in the process of participation as citizens is crucial for the coming years and, 
more likely than not – generations. And a focus on community and civil society, running 
alongside and in partnership with the classic focus on multi-party political systems and free 
media, can only help.  
 
For, as our friend Jiri Pehe has reminded us: democracy cannot function without democrats, and 
democratic institutions need as their basis the kind of culture that grows out of participation.  
 
 
 
